“After all the work carried out by the United States to try to resolve this highly complex situation, all these countries should, at a minimum, be required to sign the Abraham Accords simultaneously,” Donald Trump said in late May on the sidelines of US-Iran talks.
The statement came as a surprise even to Washington’s traditional Arab partners. The US president suggested that a future regional balance could hinge on expanding normalization between Israel and additional Arab and Muslim states.
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023, momentum toward rapprochement has clearly slowed. Saudi Arabia, long viewed as the most significant potential breakthrough in normalization with Israel, has since put the process on hold.
“Land for Peace”
Beyond the shock of ongoing wars, the idea of Arab-Israeli rapprochement is far from new. For nearly half a century, the Middle East has oscillated between open confrontation, quiet diplomacy, and peace agreements that have gradually reshaped the regional order.
For decades after the creation of Israel in 1948, most Arab states refused to recognize the Jewish state diplomatically. The wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973 deeply shaped regional dynamics. From the 1970s onward, however, a diplomatic doctrine began to emerge: “land for peace,” whereby Israel would trade territorial withdrawals for political recognition and security guarantees.
When Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, the move was unprecedented, no Arab leader had ever made an official visit to Israel. Two years later, under US mediation, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords. The agreement provided for Israel’s gradual withdrawal from the Sinai, occupied since 1967, in exchange for Egypt’s official recognition of Israel and security assurances.
For Israel, it marked a major strategic breakthrough, as the largest Arab state exited the cycle of conventional wars. For Sadat, however, the political cost was immense: Egypt was suspended from the Arab League, and he was accused of breaking the Arab consensus. In October 1981, two years after the treaty, he was assassinated during a military parade in Cairo by Islamist officers opposed to peace with Israel.
Despite this trauma, the treaty endured and remains one of the cornerstones of the regional security architecture. Egyptian-Israeli relations have since deepened, particularly in energy and natural gas cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The second major breakthrough came in 1994 with Jordan. The Wadi Araba Treaty stabilized borders, established water-sharing mechanisms, and institutionalized security cooperation that has become essential for both countries.
The Abraham Accords and Regional Reconfiguration
For a long time, however, Arab-Israeli relations were not limited to formal treaties. From the 1990s onward, several states began opening more pragmatic channels of engagement. Qatar established trade relations with Israel in 1996 in the context of the Oslo process. These ties remained limited but symbolic: in 2007, former Israeli Prime Minister and later President Shimon Peres made an official visit to Doha. The Israeli trade office was eventually closed following the 2008–2009 Gaza war. Nevertheless, both sides have continued to maintain unofficial contacts, particularly in relation to mediation efforts surrounding the Gaza conflict.
Mauritania went further by formally recognizing Israel in 1999, becoming one of the few Arab states to do so. However, Nouakchott suspended relations in 2010 amid rising tensions linked to the Palestinian issue.
The advent of the Abraham Accords marked a turning point. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and later Sudan normalized relations with Israel within a framework that broke with the traditional “land for peace” doctrine. Under the first Trump administration, the United States sought to reshape the Middle East around a security axis aimed at countering Iranian influence. Normalization thus became an explicit geopolitical instrument.
For the UAE, rapprochement with Israel has opened expanded access to military technology, intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity, and advanced defense capabilities. This security dimension became particularly visible during the regional escalation in March and April 2026, when multiple reports pointed to close coordination between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi on air defense, early warning systems, and intelligence sharing. The UAE has emerged as one of the regional actors that has benefited most from this evolving security architecture.
Bahrain has followed a similar trajectory while strengthening its strategic partnership with Washington.
Morocco, meanwhile, has framed normalization within a distinct diplomatic equation: in exchange, the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This decision has further strained relations with neighboring Algeria.
Sudan, still undergoing a political transition following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, obtained gradual relief from international isolation and removal from certain US sanctions lists.
Talks with the Immediate Neighbourhood
The October 7 attack and the ensuing war in Gaza have significantly slowed this momentum. Saudi Arabia has frozen ongoing discussions with both Israel and Washington. Several countries have since hardened their rhetoric, with the Palestinian cause remaining a unifying issue across Arab public opinion. That said, none of the states that signed the Abraham Accords have reversed their decision. At the same time, Israel continues to seek openings within its immediate neighbourhood.
Relations with Lebanon, in particular, are not new. During the Lebanese civil war and following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Tel Aviv and Beirut signed a US-brokered agreement in 1983 aimed at ending the state of war and arranging the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanese territory. The deal, however, collapsed under internal Lebanese power dynamics, Syrian opposition, and domestic political divisions, and was formally annulled the following year.
In the wake of regional reconfiguration after October 7, 2023, and amid clashes in southern Lebanon with Hezbollah, negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv have resumed under US mediation. Initially, these talks have focused on curbing the militia’s activities and securing a phased Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
In Syria, contacts with Israel have also followed a long history of diplomatic attempts. Under Hafez al-Assad, Damascus and Tel Aviv engaged repeatedly in indirect negotiations over the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967. Despite several rounds of talks, including in the 1990s under US mediation, no final agreement was reached, with full Israeli withdrawal remaining the key sticking point. Today, the context has shifted. Syria’s new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa has adopted a more pragmatic stance, open to limited security arrangements. Indirect contacts, notably in Baku and Abu Dhabi, are exploring a framework for stabilisation around the Golan, centred on de-escalation mechanisms and regional security, without formal political recognition at this stage.
Haftar, Somaliland, Kurdistan: Tel Aviv’s Informal Networks
Israel has maintained unofficial relations with Iraqi Kurdistan since the 1960s, originally as part of a regional balancing strategy against Saddam Hussein and later Iran’s growing influence. After 2003, these ties reportedly deepened, particularly in intelligence and security cooperation, with Erbil at times described as a strategic vantage point for monitoring Iran. Although never formally acknowledged, these links have remained discreet and carefully managed in order to avoid undermining relations between Erbil, Baghdad, and neighbouring states.
In Libya, contacts with Israel remain unofficial and indirect, primarily centred on the country’s eastern region controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Despite the absence of formal recognition, several reports point to quiet exchanges and overlapping security interests, particularly regarding counterterrorism efforts and monitoring Turkish and Iranian influence in the Mediterranean. These interactions, while unconfirmed officially, reflect a broader Israeli approach of cultivating informal footholds in politically fragmented environments.
In the Horn of Africa, Somaliland has gradually emerged as a discreet area of interest for Israel. Tel Aviv reportedly became the first country to recognise the independence of this autonomous region in northern Somalia in December 2025. Informal exchanges have developed over the years, particularly around security and logistical issues linked to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This presence fits into a wider strategic effort to monitor maritime routes and Houthi activity in Yemen, an Iran-aligned group, in an increasingly sensitive corridor for global trade.
This reality underscores a constant feature of the Middle East: the absence of formal recognition has never prevented the existence of political, economic, or security ties. The Abraham Accords did not create this dynamic; they made it visible. The question now is whether the war in Gaza has merely paused its trajectory, or fundamentally altered its conditions.