As tensions with Iran enter a new phase, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, called on August 31 for a lasting political solution. “A state of no war, no peace cannot be a sustainable solution,” he said, adding that “the policy of targeting Arab Gulf states and Jordan has proven to be a failure.”
The senior Emirati official called for “realistic and sustainable political solutions,” with de-escalation and the restoration of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz among the key priorities. The position is consistent with Abu Dhabi’s traditionally pragmatic diplomacy: before the war, the UAE had developed extensive commercial ties with Tehran while simultaneously deepening its strategic partnership with Washington and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, with Israel.
However, the UAE’s posture has shifted considerably over the course of the conflict. Initially determined to avoid being directly drawn into military operations against Iran, the country subsequently came under repeated waves of Iranian missile and drone attacks. In May, the Wall Street Journal reported, with three sources close to the matter subsequently corroborating the information to Reuters, that the UAE had itself carried out direct strikes against targets inside Iran in retaliation for Iranian attacks. Abu Dhabi, however, has never officially acknowledged conducting those operations.
Diplomacy on a tightrope
The conflict has also led to an unprecedented level of military cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Israel. According to Axios, Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the deployment of an Iron Dome battery, interceptor missiles and several dozen Israeli military personnel to the UAE early in the war, following a conversation with Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. The system reportedly intercepted dozens of Iranian projectiles. It marked the first time Israel had deployed an Iron Dome battery to another country.
The UAE had already acquired Israeli Barak and SPYDER air-defence systems following the normalisation of relations with Israel.
Gargash’s position should therefore be viewed against this evolving backdrop: Abu Dhabi is seeking to combine military deterrence with the pursuit of a political way out of the conflict. The UAE has strengthened its security cooperation with Israel and the United States and reportedly carried out strikes against Iran itself, while at the same time seeking to prevent a permanent confrontation from taking hold in the Gulf.
This approach is also driven by immediate economic interests. As a regional trade and financial hub, as well as a major oil and maritime power, the UAE has much to lose from a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz or recurring military confrontations with neighbouring Iran.
Gargash’s message therefore appears less like a return to the UAE’s pre-war policy than an attempt to establish a new equilibrium: maintaining a credible capacity to retaliate while preventing escalation from becoming the region’s new normal.