THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW | October 30, 2026 | Interview by Jonathan SAWAYA
As Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa claims that the threat from Islamic State (IS) has significantly diminished, French geographer Fabrice Balanche disputes his assessment of the security situation. Nearly two years after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, IS remains “very much present” in eastern Syria and maintains clandestine cells in several cities, the Syria expert tells La Minute Arabe in an exclusive interview.
Jordanian airstrikes on October 26 against suspected IS positions in southern Syria, following the killing of nine people at a Christian funeral in Karak, have brought the jihadist threat back into focus. The strikes also killed seven civilians, according to Syrian rescue workers. Four days earlier, an operation targeting suspected jihadists near Damascus left seven people dead, including two members of the Syrian security forces.
In the inaugural edition of THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW, La Minute Arabe’s new interview series, Balanche, a lecturer at Lyon 2 University, discusses tensions between Amman and Damascus, jihadist groups hostile to al-Sharaa and the limits of the Syrian president’s control over the country. He also raises the possibility that Iran could seek to use such groups to destabilise Syria.
La Minute Arabe (LMA): Following the attack in Karak, why did Jordan launch military strikes inside Syria when Damascus is also fighting Islamic State?
Fabrice Balanche: There is mistrust between the two countries. Despite appearances, Jordan’s king is deeply suspicious of Ahmad al-Sharaa and the jihadist groups operating in Syria. Those groups are still there, with varying degrees of acquiescence from al-Sharaa.
Who carried out the attack in Karak? Was it Islamic State or another group? I don’t have the answer.
But Jordan takes this threat extremely seriously. We should remember that during the Syrian civil war, IS was active in southwestern Syria, near the Jordanian and Israeli borders.
The group even launched an offensive against Daraa in 2017–2018 and established a presence inside Jordan, including in Irbid. We should also remember the Jordanian pilot whom IS burned alive in a cage near Raqqa in 2015.
Amman intervened because the Syrian army has virtually no air force left, apart from a handful of helicopters. In this region, al-Sharaa’s forces avoid operating because Israel, just across the border, closely monitors troop movements. This makes the area particularly favourable for jihadist groups, including remnants of IS.
It is also possible that, by striking targets inside Syria, the Jordanian authorities wanted to portray the jihadist threat as coming from across the border rather than acknowledge that it also exists on Jordanian soil.
Jordan probably had to obtain Israel’s approval before operating in that area.
LMA, follow-up: Could Israeli incursions into southern Syria also drive some Syrians to join jihadist groups?
Fabrice Balanche: Yes, inevitably. Israel remains the enemy in the eyes of many Syrians. Some young Syrians in the Daraa region could indeed be tempted to join extremist groups.
Even within al-Sharaa’s army, you only have to listen to the slogans and chants at military parades to see how widespread anti-Israeli sentiment remains.
But the official media and al-Sharaa himself conceal all this. He wants to give the impression that there is no problem with Israel in order to secure the lifting of US sanctions and obtain economic and diplomatic support from Washington.
The Israelis, on the other hand, are very realistic and can see tensions with al-Sharaa rising. He fears that signing a security agreement with Israel could prompt large numbers of jihadists to turn against him.
LMA: Ahmad al-Sharaa says the Islamic State threat has diminished and the Iraqi border is secure. Do you share his assessment?
Fabrice Balanche: Al-Sharaa obviously has every reason to make that claim if he wants to attract foreign investment.
Macron’s visit to Damascus in July, accompanied by several French business leaders, was a fiasco. Bombs exploded near the Four Seasons hotel. Patrick Pouyanné, the head of TotalEnergies, certainly heard them.
TotalEnergies has not returned to the oilfields around Deir ez-Zor because it considers the security situation inadequate.
The resources that could genuinely attract investors are concentrated around Palmyra, for phosphates and gas, and in the Deir ez-Zor region, for oil. These are precisely the areas where IS remains deeply entrenched.
Al-Sharaa therefore has every reason to say everything is fine, but that is simply not the case. IS is still very much present in this region. It has also infiltrated cities and established cells there.
There are other groups hostile to al-Sharaa as well, either because they believe he has betrayed the jihadist cause or because he has refused to share power with them.
There is also the question of how the country’s resources are shared. When the Arab tribes of eastern Syria were under Kurdish control, they extracted oil, refined it themselves and sold it, sometimes through smuggling networks. They shared the proceeds with the Kurds, providing them with a source of income.
If al-Sharaa wants foreign oil companies to return, he has to secure the oilfields. But that could mean a loss of income for the tribes. By blowing up a gas pipeline or a gas facility, they could remind al-Sharaa that they will not accept oil and gas being handed over to foreign companies without receiving a share of the profits.
LMA, follow-up: How many fighters does IS still have, and how does the group operate today?
Fabrice Balanche: We don’t know how many fighters it has. Recently, the group has been operating in survival mode, remaining underground and extorting money from shopkeepers and local residents to sustain itself.
It is still pursuing that approach while seeking outside funding. And that is where Tehran could come in.
Iran could very well finance IS directly, or other Sunni jihadist groups, to carry out attacks in Syria and demonstrate to investors that the country is unsafe. This possibility should not be dismissed.
In Iraq, from 2003 onwards, the Iranians allowed al-Qaeda jihadists to pass through their territory. Bashar al-Assad’s regime also facilitated the movement of jihadists into Iraq to bog down US forces and prevent Washington, having overthrown Saddam Hussein, from turning against the Syrian and Iranian regimes.
LMA: In June, you estimated that Ahmad al-Sharaa controlled 95% of Syrian territory. Do you still stand by that figure?
Fabrice Balanche: Yes, I stand by that figure. The remaining 5% includes the Druze region of Suwayda, territories taken by Israel in the southwest, and Kobane and Qamishli, which are controlled by Kurdish militias in the north.
Although these militias signed agreements in January to integrate into the Syrian army, that does not mean al-Sharaa’s forces can operate freely in Kobane or Qamishli.
Nor is this the kind of control you would find in a Western state. Local commanders control their own areas, almost as though they were part of a feudal system, and have pledged allegiance to al-Sharaa. But they are still the ones who call the shots on the ground.
So controlling 95% of the territory does not mean exercising effective authority, with the state holding a monopoly on the use of force.
LMA, follow-up: Does the government now have greater control over the armed groups operating in its name?
Fabrice Balanche: It appears so. He does seem to have succeeded in integrating various militias into the new Syrian army. And they are loyal because he is able to pay them.
But the arrangement is fragile because everything depends on funding from the Gulf. I think the Syrian army is still being paid for now because Saudi Arabia and Qatar do not want the system to collapse, which would benefit Iran.
But there are no more blank cheques. Gulf states now provide targeted assistance and expect something in return. Yet al-Sharaa is not taking action against the pro-Iranian Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, as the Saudis in particular would like.
They remain loyal as long as they are paid. The whole thing could collapse like a house of cards if the money stops.