Arab news at a glance

Given the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf monarchies already have a few alternative routes at their disposal. But these alternatives remain incomplete, vulnerable, or even purely theoretical. None of them would be able to fully absorb a disruption in this strategic waterway, through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes.

Inadequate alternatives

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline is the most immediate option. Stretching approximately 1,200 km, it connects the eastern oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. Its capacity exceeds five million barrels per day, providing an export route out of the Gulf. However, it remains vulnerable to missile or drone strikes, as demonstrated by past attacks claimed by groups allied with Tehran, including the Houthis in Yemen.

The United Arab Emirates has a similar infrastructure with the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline. Approximately 370 km long, it transports up to 1.5 million barrels per day to the Gulf of Oman, thereby bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. But here again, its geographical proximity to Iran limits its strategic security in the event of a military escalation.

Qatar, a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), has no real alternative for bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. Its LNG carriers depart from Ras Laffan and must pass through the strait to reach global markets. The emirate is therefore primarily seeking to strengthen its position in the LNG market by increasing its production, expanding its fleet, and boosting its overseas investments. But this strategy does not protect it from a maritime blockade in the Gulf.

Iraq faces the challenge of land routes

In Iraq, several projects are under consideration to reduce dependence on the Gulf. The extension of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which stretches nearly 970 km to Turkey, aims to increase exports to the Mediterranean. Other options include a pipeline to the Syrian port of Banyas or a link to Aqaba in Jordan. However, these projects remain hampered by major security and political constraints.

New corridors, old routes

On a broader scale, the India–Middle East–Europe (IMEC) corridor, launched in September 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi, illustrates the desire to diversify major trade flows between Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. The project aims to connect India to the United Arab Emirates, then to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, by combining maritime, rail, and energy links all the way to the Mediterranean.

The IMEC could thus allow certain India-Europe trade flows to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but as it stands, it does not enable the large-scale export of hydrocarbons produced within the Gulf in the event of a closure of the strait. It therefore falls more under a long-term connectivity strategy than an operational response to the Gulf’s energy vulnerability.

The former Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), which linked Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese port of Saida via Jordan and Syria, also illustrates these bypass routes that are now out of use. Designed in the 1940s to transport Saudi oil to the Mediterranean, the pipeline was gradually crippled by regional conflicts, sabotage, and political tensions, until it was effectively shut down in 1990. Its reactivation, sometimes proposed as a way to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, remains unlikely due to its obsolescence, its cost, and the instability of the countries it traverses.

Saudi Arabia’s delusions of grandeur

The “Salman Canal” project is a proposal to create a new waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. It would consist of a canal approximately 950 km long crossing the “Empty Quarter” desert, with a possible extension through western Oman in the event of instability in Yemen. With a width of 150 meters and a depth of 25 meters, it would allow large oil tankers to pass through, reduce shipping distances, and relieve maritime traffic congestion in the Gulf.

Proponents estimate that this project could stimulate economic development in the regions it traverses, with the creation of industrial zones, new cities, and approximately one million jobs. Estimated at nearly $80 billion, it is said to have attracted the interest of Saudi authorities, but remains at this stage theoretical due to its high cost and technical and political challenges.

Alternative or proposed routes to bypass the Strait of Hormuz remain long-term solutions that require heavy investment, lasting political and security stability, as well as structural adjustments that are difficult to implement.