Arab news at a glance

After a wave of attacks in Mali in late April involving JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and northern separatists, the threat moved closer to Bamako. Algeria swiftly reaffirmed its support for the “unity” of its southern neighbor and its rejection of “terrorism.”

The statement was aimed at answering accusations of ambiguity, with Bamako suspecting Algiers of being too accommodating toward some northern Malian groups in the name of mediation.

But behind the clarification lies a deeper tension: Mali is trying to move away from Algerian influence, even as its security crisis makes its northern neighbor difficult to sideline.

Algeria is back in the middle of Mali’s crisis because the conflict touches on its southern border, its long-standing role as a mediator in the Sahel and its regional rivalry with Morocco.

• FAR FROM BAMAKO, CLOSE TO ALGERIA

Some 1,200 km from Bamako, northern Mali has for years remained beyond the state’s full control.

Linked to southern Algeria by Saharan routes and by Tuareg and Arab communities straddling the border, the vast region, known as Azawad to autonomists, has become a hub of rebellions, trafficking networks, local rivalries and jihadist expansion.

For Algiers, instability next door can quickly become a national security concern.

• THE ALGIERS ACCORD BAMAKO WALKED AWAY FROM

In 2015, Algeria brokered a peace deal between Bamako and armed groups in northern Mali, aimed at preventing Azawad’s independence and bringing the north more fully into national institutions.

Algiers sought to preserve Mali’s unity through compromise. According to IRIS, the deal was meant to grant the north greater autonomy, integrate some rebel fighters into the national army and fund development in the long-marginalized region.

But the relationship deteriorated sharply in late 2023, after Algiers hosted figures from northern Mali and the two countries recalled their ambassadors. A few weeks later, in January 2024, Bamako announced it was withdrawing from the accord.

• BAMAKO TURNS TO MOSCOW AND A MILITARY APPROACH

After two coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali’s junta broke with its former diplomatic and security partners: French and U.N. forces left, while Bamako sought to retake territory with Moscow’s backing.

Bamako says it wants to restore state authority. But Algiers sees the strategy as too heavy-handed, warning that a purely military response could deepen the crisis and push instability toward Algeria’s own south.

• THE LIMITS OF BAMAKO’S MILITARY GAMBLE

The large-scale attacks in late April, during which Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, was killed, have given weight to Algeria’s concerns.

They also exposed a temporary convergence between JNIM and Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front, or FLA, against the Malian state, a development that could undermine the military bet pursued by Bamako and its Russian partner.

In Algeria, the daily El Khabar has portrayed the attacks as evidence of the junta’s failed military strategy after it abandoned the Algiers accord.

• ALGIERS CONDEMNS THE ATTACKS, BUT KEEPS CHANNELS OPEN

That position was set out on April 27 by Algeria’s foreign minister, Ahmed Attaf, who reaffirmed his country’s support for “the unity of Mali, its territory, people and institutions” and its rejection of “all forms and manifestations of terrorism.”

But the condemnation does not mean Algiers is cutting off its channels with northern Mali. For Algeria, those contacts are part of mediation; for Bamako, they look like interference.

• WESTERN SAHARA, ANOTHER POINT OF FRICTION

The Western Sahara dispute has added another layer of tension. On April 10, Mali withdrew its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and backed Morocco’s autonomy plan.

For Algiers, a long-standing supporter of the Polisario Front, the move sent a strong political signal: Bamako is drawing closer to Rabat, Algeria’s main regional rival. The Moroccan outlet Ahdath.info went so far as to suggest a link between Mali’s diplomatic shift and the late-April attacks, implying Algerian involvement without providing verifiable evidence.

• THE ALGERIAN PARADOX

That is where the ambiguity lies. Algeria has no interest in seeing Mali break apart: an independent Azawad on its southern border could give jihadist factions and other armed groups a zone of instability directly connected to Algerian territory.

But Algiers rejects Bamako’s approach. It believes the Tuareg and Arab armed groups in the north, which signed the Algiers accord, must remain within a political process, or risk moving closer to jihadist groups.

Despite the break initiated by Bamako, Algeria remains tied to the Malian crisis by geography, cross-border networks and its own security imperatives. That reality makes it hard to push Algiers aside, even for a junta that now openly challenges its role.



Sources: IRIS – Observatoire du Maghreb, Akram Kharief, “Algeria-Mali: Chronicle of a Foretold Rupture,” February 2024; Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs / APS; Reuters; AP; Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs; El-Khabar; Ahdath.info.